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Abstract 
Innovation theory has pointed to the complex, non-linear character of innovation 
processes. Heterogeneous networks of actors including a mixed spectrum of many 
and diverse academic, economic, and governmental agencies combine to achieve 
innovations. Is there any role for innovation policy beyond influencing framework 
conditions in such a situation? The article analyzes the case of a successful innova-
tion in the energy sector: photovoltaics. It argues that - given the special character-
istics of the energy sector – successful innovation depended on strong political 
support and an advocacy coalition, which achieved institutional backing. The 
method chosen to realize the innovation was the creation of a niche market with 
the help of regulatory instruments. 
94 STI Studies 2008: 93-113 
 
1 Introduction 
The energy system in industrialized 
nations is changing in what can be 
seen as an example of a technological 
and institutional regime change. Victor 
(2002) sees the sector in its third struc-
tural transformation. The exact out-
come of this regime change is uncer-
tain. But one element of a future new 
governance structure will be an in-
creasing importance of decentralized 
forms of electric power generation, a 
shift towards more environmentally 
sustainable technologies, e.g. renew-
able energy technologies, which in the 
past were pushed forward by a coali-
tion of diverse actors. One of the inno-
vative developments in the area of 
renewable energy technologies will be 
analyzed in this article: photovoltaics 
(PV). 
We will use a broad lens in order to 
examine the growth of PV both as a 
source of electric power generation 
and as a business sector in Germany. 
PV can be considered as an unusual 
success story in which the ability of 
state authorities to strongly influence 
renewable energy production and as-
sociated economic activity becomes 
apparent. 
It will be argued that the growth of 
renewable energy proceeds within 
networks of governance, which com-
prise formal regimes at multiple levels, 
informal norms and practices as well 
as market structures and processes. 
These networks involve national and 
sub-national authorities, multilateral 
institutions, firms and NGOs. Techno-
logical development and market 
growth of PV are thus viewed as em-
bedded in a broad social, economic, 
and political system of governance. 
Corporate strategies, social move-
ments and public policy constitute this 
sector’s essential elements of govern-
ance. We will further argue that PV 
policy in Germany is characterized by a 
commitment to a specific mission, a 
concertation of the main actors, a long 
term orientation and substantive sub-
sidies. Insofar PV appears as a suc-
cessful “planned” innovation, rarely 
found in the relevant literature. 
Caniels/Romijn (2008: 246) have ar-
gued that the literature on strategic 
niche management is short of success 
stories. Thus, we know little about the 
processes by which (policy and tech-
nological) experiments can ultimately 
culminate in viable market niches that 
ultimately will contribute to a regime 
change in a specific sector. The pre-
sent article will try to fill this gap. 
We will start with a clarification of our 
concept of innovation and then de-
scribe the elements of the technologi-
cal system PV. Based on this we will 
discuss the ingredients of the success 
story. At the moment it would be fool-
ish to claim that PV will remain a suc-
cess story in the future and eventually 
play a dominant role in the develop-
ment of a new energy regime. PV is 
growing but it is still in its infant state 
– albeit already bigger than many “es-
tablished” sectors. Only few publica-
tions have focused on the particular 
technological and institutional prereq-
uisites, which enabled photovoltaics to 
become a real success story, outcom-
peting – from an innovation perspec-
tive – other energy technologies. 
2 Innovation and Sectoral Sys-
tems of Innovation 
Before discussing the German innova-
tion policy focussing on the develop-
ment and market expansion of photo-
voltaics, we have to outline the con-
ceptual framework of our analysis. We 
start with some general reflections on 
innovation and innovation policy, 
drawing on the literature on systems 
of innovation and strategic niche man-
agement on the one hand and the ad-
vocacy coalition approach on the 
other. 
2.1 Innovation Policy 
Since the 1990s a global policy-shift 
towards research and technology can 
be observed: the promotion of innova-
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tion has become the centre piece of 
official national as well as of supra- 
and sub-national policies. This shift in 
emphasis reflects discussions on the 
role of the state in promoting technol-
ogy as well as new ideas about how 
new technologies become successful 
on the markets. 
The traditional model in research and 
technology policies either centred on 
the support of basic research which 
eventually should bring about new 
technologies ripe for the markets 
(technology push) or opted for a mis-
sion oriented approach promoting a 
specific new technology and financing 
its development by certain companies 
or research laboratories. (cf. 
Hiskes/Hiskes 1986) 
Innovation research, however, has 
shown that there is no linear develop-
ment of technological innovation to-
wards successful adoption and diffu-
sion (cf. Van de Ven et al. 1999). Sup-
port of basic research does not guar-
antee the eventual development of 
products that become widely accepted 
and thus achieve commercial success. 
But exactly “success on the market” 
seems to become top priority in times 
of increasing worldwide competition 
on crowded markets. The introduction 
of new, innovative products is consid-
ered to be a precondition for keeping a 
competitive edge. 
In parallel discussions on the steering 
capacities of the state a dire picture 
was painted, accentuating the convic-
tion that the state cannot successfully 
choose technologies, which will later 
be a success on the market. Along with 
an increasingly prevalent attitude that 
markets are the best innovators and 
should be left alone, policy instru-
ments worldwide seemed to converge 
(cf. Holzinger/Jörgens/Knill 2007). This 
neoliberal understanding, the support 
of market dominance and “the retreat 
of the state” (Strange 1996)   emerged 
in the 1990s,  and was accompanied by 
new types of policies and policy in-
struments, which also affected the 
conception of technology policy. Re-
search and technology policy has now 
turned into innovation policy and 
mainly focuses on funding basic re-
search and networking activities – in 
particular joint projects between firms 
and research institutes – in order to 
stimulate knowledge flows and to en-
sure that results in scientific research 
may be used and adopted commer-
cially (cf. Nooteboom 1999, Edquist 
2001:18). Networks may facilitate pro-
ducer-customer relationships or even 
result in the creation of an advocacy 
coalition, which experts consider an 
important pre-condition for successful 
radical innovations (cf. Weimer-
Jehle/Fuchs 2007). 
Although the market discourse has 
achieved nearly universal legitimacy, 
counter tendencies have always been 
visible as well. One of the policy meas-
ures relying more on the activities of 
public actors is the politically sup-
ported creation of niche markets. This 
new form of innovation policy selects a 
certain technology (or its pre-stage) in 
advance and tries to speed up its de-
velopment, and even might help to 
shape the mode of its application. 
Such politically created niche markets 
work through market stimulation pro-
grammes, like subsidies or the provi-
sion of soft loans for prospective cus-
tomers, as well as through modes of 
legitimizing the developing technology 
in order to raise its public acceptance 
(cf. Edler 2007).  Especially in the area 
of environmental technologies, strate-
gic niche management has increas-
ingly become accepted as an instru-
ment of innovation policy (cf. Kemp et 
al 1998; Kemp 2002; Coenen 2002) 
with the hope that even a transforma-
tion of a whole technological regime 
can be enabled (cf. Berkhout et al 
2003: 4; Caniels/Romijn 2008). 
But in both cases the actual design of 
national policies has to consider exist-
ing institutional frameworks and 
socio-cultural conditions. Studies in 
the tradition of the Varieties of Capital-
ism approach (Hall/Soskice 2001) 
 
96 STI Studies 2008: 93-113 
 
claim, that if national innovation pol-
icy stresses and uses national com-
parative institutional advantages, it 
can be more successful. In other words 
a system dominated by non-market 
coordination will have difficulties 
pushing new technologies dependent 
on a flexible and quick functioning of 
market mechanisms. While on the 
other hand the support of technologies 
which require the non-market coordi-
nation of various actors will be difficult 
in liberal market economies. Based on 
this highly stylised interpretation we 
argue that the creation of (sheltered) 
niche markets can be a successful pol-
icy instrument especially in coordi-
nated market economies (hypothesis 
1). 
Considering the fact, that photovol-
taics can be seen as a technological 
innovation that is supported in order 
to transform the energy sector, the 
existence of political and social forces 
which strongly oppose photovoltaics 
due to ideological and economic (rent 
seeking) reasons can be assumed. As 
Jänicke has shown, changes in actor 
constellations have resulted in im-
proved terms for innovation in envi-
ronmentally friendly products (cf. 
1997: 7). With regard to actor constel-
lations and situational factors enhanc-
ing policy change, the policy analysis 
literature refers to the role of advocacy 
coalitions that are crucially important 
in order to spur institutional or cul-
tural changes (cf. Litfin 2000). There-
fore we argue that the success of inno-
vation policy depends on its ability to 
create and mobilise an advocacy coali-
tion supporting the aimed technology, 
especially if strong incumbent actors 
(like in the established energy system) 
exist (hypothesis 2). 
2.2 Innovation 
Innovation can be defined as artefacts, 
processes, ideas, strategies, which 
successfully change routines and are 
embedded in specific contexts of de-
velopment and usage. Innovation as 
such is not just a new idea or technical 
system, but one, which is being suc-
cessfully implemented. Including the 
processes of implementation, however, 
it becomes difficult to disentangle e.g. 
the technical artefact from the way it is 
being developed and used. 
Innovation in this sense is not a linear 
process but occurs by interactive rela-
tionships and feedback mechanisms 
between institutional and organisa-
tional elements of science, technology, 
learning, production, policy, firms and 
potential or actual market demand. 
Some technologies may only become 
innovations due to interactions be-
tween producers and users or the spe-
cific way; customers use and apply 
new technical artefacts (cf. Malerba 
2004: 24). The acceptance and use of a 
new technology at any rate plays a 
crucial role in the innovation process. 
Thus new – better – technologies in 
our context are only referred to as in-
novations, if they find their way to the 
market. 
2.3 Innovation and Uncertainty 
It is generally acknowledged that every 
(economic) activity has to face the 
problem of uncertainty (Beckert 1996). 
This is even more so in the case of 
innovations, particularly if potential 
new products would have to cope with 
incumbent products and existing infra-
structures and routines supporting 
them. Proven ways to cope with uncer-
tainty are the development and reli-
ance on routines, customs, regula-
tions, established institutions etc. 
Innovating firms may not know which 
application or design a new technology 
should be given in order to be success-
ful in the market. This can lead firms 
to hesitate implementing significant 
changes, even as they face a volatile 
environment that increases pressures 
to introduce new products, seek new 
markets and introduce new technolo-
gies, practices and organisational 
methods into their production proc-
esses. Uncertainty can also make it 
more difficult for firms to obtain exter-
nal funding for their innovation pro-
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jects. Customers may not trust a new 
and unproven technology. This leads 
to another mechanism blocking the 
diffusion of a new technology, which is 
lack of legitimacy. 
We are here confronted with the para-
dox that innovation as a routine 
changing mechanism, nevertheless 
also depends on routines, albeit newly 
developing ones. Therefore innovation 
policy can aim to reduce uncertainty 
by establishing a mix of policy instru-
ments along with a viable support coa-
lition. Whenever, e.g. innovation policy 
can provide technological develop-
ments with legitimacy, the financial 
system will become more willing to 
invest in innovative firms and potential 
customers may feel more safe and be 
more induced to purchase new tech-
nologies (cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson 1997: 
285). 
The role of uncertainty can be seen 
very clearly if we look at the develop-
ments in the 1990s when the German 
PV industry was close to become ex-
tinct. Production facilities were moved, 
since producers considered it uncer-
tain whether the institutional frame-
work in Germany could provide fa-
vourable conditions for the further 
development of the PV industry. 
As Edquist suggests, a systemic view 
on innovation policy should not only 
analyse the role of the state but also 
include feedback mechanisms to find 
out how the rest of the system, social 
structures, routines or even discrete 
occurrences influence innovation poli-
cies (cf. 2001: 17). German governance 
has always been characterised by close 
linkages and common interests be-
tween government, industry, business 
associations and unions (cf. 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Harding 2000). This 
established arrangement has shaped 
German innovation policies and most 
probably will also do so in the case of 
PV. 
 
2.4 The Transformation of Electric 
Power Generation 
Photovoltaics is treated as an innova-
tion within and for the industrial sec-
tor of electric power generation. As 
already briefly mentioned this sector is 
undergoing severe changes in nearly 
all industrialized nations. The dynam-
ics leading to these changes are also 
important to understand the case of 
PV, because they opened up a window 
of opportunity, which helped to push 
forward this new option. 
The traditional electric power system 
can be characterized as a large techni-
cal system (cf. Mayntz/Hughes 1988) 
with tightly coupled components run 
by a few, powerful incumbent actors. 
Energy generation is highly centralized 
in big power stations, open markets 
hardly exist. Price regulation and fixa-
tion is common and huge subsidies for 
the development of old and new tech-
nologies (e.g. coal, nuclear energy) 
make it difficult to determine “real” 
prizes. It is suggested that the costs of 
producing electricity, gained out of 
coal or oil would double, if intranspar-
ent external costs were taken into ac-
count (cf. Milborrow 2002: 32). Incum-
bent energy technologies have re-
ceived direct and indirect subsidies for 
decades (cf. Jacobsson/Bergek 2004: 
210). R&D expenditures in these closed 
markets are nevertheless low and in-
novation is slow moving and incre-
mental. R&D expenditures to a very 
large degree depend on the interpreta-
tion of political signals regarding the 
regulation of technology. 
Two trends that challenge the tradi-
tional ways of power generation can 
be observed: the liberalisation of infra-
structures and environmental issues 
such as the “global warming”. Hopes 
that an effective regime to address 
climate change will emerge have 
shifted from the emphasis on a man-
datory multilateral agreement, the 
Kyoto protocol, to a plethora of re-
gional, national, and sub-national pro-
grams and initiatives. Policy responses 
include carbon emission limits and 
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trading systems, direct subsidies for 
renewables, and renewable portfolio 
standards that mandate the use of 
specific volumes of renewable energy 
in electricity generation. Such policy 
initiatives are required because the 
market will not, by itself, respond ade-
quately to the environmental chal-
lenge. Given the rapid growth expected 
in global markets for low-emission 
technologies, the policy agenda is also 
driven by economic development 
goals, as countries vie for competitive-
ness and market share in these emerg-
ing fields. Liberalization can have di-
verging effects on renewable energies. 
If energy prices fall as a result of liber-
alization and increasing market com-
petition (as the pure theory would 
make us expect) the price targets that 
renewables must meet become more 
challenging and liberalization might 
prove to be an impediment for their 
further spread. On the other hand, 
policies and systems such as quotas 
and renewable energy certificates can 
be compatible with more competitive 
market structures as the experiences 
of the last years have shown when 
energy prices increased considerably. 
In fact, many of the policies that have 
been implemented to support renew-
ables operate within the framework of 
liberal markets. (Cf. OECD 2008) 
Finally, beyond the problems of a lack 
of transparency and the prevalence of 
risk-averse actors, there is the con-
straint of centralized energy infrastruc-
tures, which have developed and be-
come established throughout decades. 
National grids are mainly tailored to 
the operation of centralized power 
plants and thus support their exis-
tence. Alternative technologies like 
photovoltaics follow an opposite de-
centralised logic that does not easily fit 
into the established technological con-
cepts. Thus, PV has difficulties compet-
ing with the incumbent technologies 
(cf. Stern 2006: 355). 
In sum this has led to the widely ac-
cepted conviction that policy instru-
ments to create niche markets for re-
newable energies were needed. Even 
the European Commission, tradition-
ally favouring market instruments and 
being quite critical towards demand 
side policy actions, has opted for mar-
ket stimulation programmes for re-
newable energy technologies (cf. 
European Commission 2005; Directive 
2001/77/EC). This is true in spite of the 
fact that until recently the European 
Commission and the OECD both had 
disapproved the German model of 
market stimulation and instead had 
favoured quota models which use 
market signals in order to increase the 
supply of renewable energy (cf. Busch 
2005: 235). 
3 Photovoltaics: Characteristics of 
the technology 
Analysing the photovoltaics success 
story, we need to give a short intro-
duction to the technologies and appli-
cations we are talking about. Photo-
voltaics use solar cells to produce 
electric power1. The most common 
type of solar cell consists of either 
mono-crystalline or poly-crystalline 
silicon, which is conventionally pro-
duced and used in the electronics 
(semiconductor) industry. Crystalline 
silicon technologies represent a 93 % 
share of the photovoltaics world mar-
ket (cf. Solarbuzz 2007). Mono-
crystalline silicon cells are character-
ised by their ability to convert a rela-
tively large section of the light spec-
trum into electricity with an efficiency 
of up to 24,7 per cent under ideal labo-
ratory conditions (cf. Solarserver 
2007). Poly-crystalline silicon cells do 
not achieve such high efficiencies, but 
they compensate it with price-
advantages. The same holds for amor-
phous and other ‘thin film’ technolo-
gies that consist of cadmium telluride 
(CdTe) or copper indium diselenide 
(CIS). Due to silicon shortages for sev-
eral years now, research and develop-
                                                       
1 Photovoltaics should not to be mixed up 
with solar-thermy, which uses solar radia-
tion to produce heat. 
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ment on non-silicon thin film tech-
nologies has become increasingly 
popular and remarkable reductions in 
production costs have been achieved. 
The French physicist Alexandre Bec-
querel first discovered the photovoltaic 
effect in 1839. Albert Einstein’s theo-
retical work on the photovoltaic effect 
won the Nobel Prize in 1921. This il-
lustrates that basic research on photo-
voltaics has been carried out for dec-
ades. But first applications did not 
appear until the 1950s, when Bell 
Laboratories invented the first solar 
cell and the US government started to 
use solar cells for satellites. 
“The satellite market became the first sig-
nificant commercial market and annual 
production rose to about 0,1 MWp per year 
in the late 1960s.” (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 
10) 
It is striking that the first satellite pro-
ject using solar power was under US 
Navy management and monitored by 
the Department of Defense. Some au-
thors therefore pointed out that 
photovoltaics was just the case of an-
other technology for which the role of 
the military was crucial in the innova-
tion process (cf. Clark/Juma 1987: 142, 
Jacobsson et al 2002: 10). Due to US 
export restrictions the European Space 
Agency had to rely on German compa-
nies like Siemens and Telefunken to 
get involved in photovoltaics research 
and production for space programs in 
the 1960s (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 
16). Since the 1970s and largely owing 
to the oil crises, interest in the devel-
opment of various terrestrial applica-
tions grew and led to further R&D ac-
tivities, mainly in the USA and Japan. A 
range of off-grid applications emerged, 
that were mainly used for consumer 
electronics like calculators and 
watches or as stand-alone ‘power sta-
tions’ for SOS telephones and in re-
mote places like alpine huts and camp-
ing sites. Beyond this the idea of solar 
home systems for developing countries 
came up. Rather distinct from these 
off-grid photovoltaics are newer forms 
of applications that supply electricity 
to the grid just as conventional power 
technologies. Grid-connected applica-
tions can be found as roof-top sys-
tems, ground-mounted systems or as 
systems integrated into house façades. 
However, early projects demonstrating 
how to use photovoltaics in order to 
supply electricity to the grid did not 
appear before the 1990s. Thus grid-
connected photovoltaics is a rather 
new development. It is therefore strik-
ing that since 1999 in IEA (Interna-
tional Energy Agency) reporting coun-
tries grid-connected photovoltaics has 
rapidly outpaced other applications (cf. 
IEA 2005). 
4 Promoting photovoltaics 
In the following we will analyse the 
development of photovoltaics based 
on the hypothesis that an advocacy 
coalition is a crucial mechanism be-
hind the formulation and implementa-
tion of innovation policies. 
“Private firms, state agencies and other 
organisations often act with the objective 
to influence innovation policies in order to 
get them designed and implemented in 
their own interest” (cf. Edquist 2001: 20). 
So called advocacy coalitions support-
ing environmental policies consist of 
administrative and academic environ-
mentalists as well as members of envi-
ronmental social movements who co-
operate with industrial actors, such as 
manufacturers of renewable energy 
technologies (cf. Jänicke 2007: 140). 
But since lobbyism is often a conserva-
tive mechanism, as it requires that the 
lobbyists have an economic power 
position, one would not assume that 
environmentalists were able to form an 
effective advocacy coalition. Interest 
groups, which support emerging tech-
nologies, are normally neither well 
positioned financially nor do they have 
access to powerful political actors. 
Even though the advocacy coalition for 
photovoltaics was not formed by pow-
erful actors and groups, it intelligently 
managed to use external events to gain 
strong social backing for its ideas, 
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which was needed, as it faced powerful 
opposition by the incumbent energy 
producers. 
“Substituting established technologies 
implies, (…), that new interest groups will 
challenge existing ones, and a realignment 
of the institutional framework, and a trans-
formation of the energy system cannot be 
expected to be achieved without overcom-
ing considerable opposition from vested 
interests involved with the incumbent 
technologies.” (Jacobsson et al 2002: 3) 
4.1 The formative stage (1970s – 
1990s) 
The story of PV began like many other 
cases of German research policy. Start-
ing in the early eighties the common 
instruments for the public funding of 
research and development like institu-
tional funding of relevant research 
departments doing basic research were 
used. The external trigger for early 
research had been the oil crisis in the 
1970s. At that time the ministry of re-
search and technology (BMFT) was in 
charge of photovoltaics policy pro-
grams. Initially the support for new 
technology had been integrated into 
the unit for non-nuclear energy tech-
nologies. In 1976, an independent unit 
was created (cf. Ristau 1998: 40). In-
terestingly, many of the programs to 
finance photovoltaics projects, were 
carried out by the ministry of eco-
nomic cooperation and development, 
because during the 1970s the future of 
photovoltaics applications was seen in 
solar home systems for developing 
countries, i.e. the focus was on off-grid 
applications. 
First steps towards an advocacy coali-
tion in the 1980s 
When oil prices had settled down 
again and with the beginning of the 
conservative-liberal coalition under 
Chancellor Kohl, policy actions in or-
der to promote photovoltaics declined 
severely. In 1985 public funding of 
photovoltaics related research and 
development projects did not account 
for more than 53 Mio DM. Albeit insti-
tutional actors involved in research on 
photovoltaics had been established 
and later on, when other external 
events like the Chernobyl accident 
occurred and discussions on environ-
mental problems or on climate change 
appeared, they managed, together with 
environmentalist groups, to set the 
agenda for photovoltaics. When politi-
cal actors put environmental problems 
higher on the political agenda, the 
Green party on the one hand and 
highly motivated researchers on the 
other hand acted as transmission belts 
between external events and political 
and social discourses. 
In the 1980s specialized photovoltaics 
departments and research institutes 
had been created, like the Fraunhofer 
Institut für Solare Energiesysteme in 
Freiburg (in 1982), the Zentrum für 
Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-
Forschung in Stuttgart/Ulm (in 1988) 
or specialized physics departments, for 
example at the Carl von Ossietzky Uni-
versity of Oldenburg. The latter can be 
seen as a typical example of how the 
formation of the photovoltaics advo-
cacy coalition depended on highly 
committed individual actors. They 
were influenced by the experiences 
made by early anti-nuclear power ac-
tivists, who were criticized for their 
lack of reasonable alternatives for en-
ergy provision (cf. Gabler 2007). The 
formation of research groups and de-
partments dedicated to the develop-
ment of alternatives to nuclear power 
became the first strategic step towards 
the formation of an advocacy coalition 
supporting photovoltaics. Further-
more, the creation of specialized de-
partments and institutes attracted en-
vironmentally committed scientists, 
and later local networks consisting of 
environmentalists and researchers 
emerged. A prominent case is Freiburg, 
where the Fraunhofer Institut für So-
lare Energiesysteme merged with a 
vivid environmental scene that posi-
tively influenced network activities and 
enabled local strategies of niche man-
agement (cf. Niewienda 2006). 
Federal innovation policy at that time 
became mainly direct project funding. 
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The main recipients were the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Solar Energy Sys-
tems, the Hahn-Meitner-Institute, the 
Institute for Solar Energy Supply Tech-
niques and two industrial actors, AEG-
Telefunken and Siemens Solar. The 
early photovoltaics programs “(…) 
provided opportunities for universities, 
institutes and firms to search in many 
directions, which was sensible given 
the underlying uncertainties with re-
spect to technologies and markets” (cf. 
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 262). Research 
funding was not only dedicated to one 
technology. Rather, competing tech-
nologies, such as crystalline silicon 
and thin-film technologies were sup-
ported. And additionally, research and 
development of inverters (to make 
grid-connected applications work) had 
started. 
Interestingly, these research projects 
on the one hand, and the absence of 
market stimulation programs on the 
other hand, led to the weird situation, 
that the big two German companies 
engaged in photovoltaics production 
managed to develop internationally 
competitive products. German re-
search on photovoltaics achieved a 
leading position alongside Japan and 
the United States, but the technologies 
developed could not be sold at home 
due to a lack of domestic demand (cf. 
Ristau 1998: 45). Actually, photovol-
taics technologies developed in Ger-
many were ready for testing. However, 
owing to the characteristics of the en-
ergy sector, coupled with the difficul-
ties of creating private demand and the 
absence of political interest and finan-
cial support it was unlikely that photo-
voltaics could succeed on the German 
market. The supporting advocacy coa-
lition was in its infancy, consisting 
only of highly committed scientists, 
environmental groups (cf Gabler 2007) 
and a first association, the newly 
founded Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Solar (DGS). In these early days the 
advocacy coalition was too weak, par-
ticularly as it had not yet incorporated 
more powerful industrial lobbies. At 
the same time influential lobby groups 
supporting fossil fuels and nuclear 
power worked hard to prevent compe-
tition from renewable energies. They 
joined forces with the ministry of eco-
nomics (cf. Ristau 1998: 46) and heav-
ily relied on old research and devel-
opment contacts and networks within 
the ministry of research (cf. Ristau 
1998: 44). 
But then external events such as the 
nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986 
changed public opinion and attitudes 
towards nuclear power substantially. 
These events opened a window of op-
portunity for a general discussion on a 
transformation of the energy sector. 
Within two years opposition against 
nuclear energy increased from 50% to 
over 70% (cf. Jahn 1992). While prior to 
Chernobyl only the Green party had 
argued against nuclear power, this 
position was now also adopted by the 
Social Democrats, who opted for phas-
ing out nuclear power plants. In addi-
tion to the national antipathy towards 
nuclear energy the influence of a 
growing Green party as well as power-
ful environmental movements have 
clearly to be mentioned. Considering 
all these circumstances, the German 
government – compared to other 
European governments – at a relatively 
early stage felt compelled to support 
research, development as well as diffu-
sion of renewable energy technologies, 
such as photovoltaics. 
Market stimulation in the early 1990s 
Market stimulation programs are tradi-
tionally policy instruments of the min-
istry of economics, but these instru-
ments have not been applied until 
1991. As we have mentioned before, 
the ministry of economics deliberately 
refused to support the photovoltaics 
research and development projects of 
the ministry of research. And since the 
new technology could definitely not be 
economically competitive in Germany, 
it either had to fail, find its markets 
abroad (in Southern regions, as off 
grid applications in the developing 
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world) or get domestic support in 
terms of an artificial niche market. 
Finally in 1991, the situation changed 
when the first feed-in-law was devel-
oped and passed. It described a 
mechanism based on which utilities 
were obliged to remunerate energy of 
renewable sources fed into the grid. 
Producers of renewable electric power 
received 90% of the average revenue 
per kilowatt-hour from the utilities. 
Even though the first feed-in-law was 
sort of a market stimulation program, 
it contained a market mechanism, 
which at the beginning was not seen 
as critical. But with energy prices de-
clining throughout the 1990s (mainly 
due to European deregulation poli-
cies), this policy instrument emerged 
as being too weak to trigger market 
expansion for photovoltaics. 
This first feed-in-law was accompanied 
by the 1000-roofs-program in the early 
1990s, which enabled first experiences 
with grid-connected photovoltaics 
applications and thus can be inter-
preted as a typical instrument of stra-
tegic niche management. This program 
that started in 1991 and ended in 1995 
was a mixture of demonstration and 
market stimulation. It offered soft 
loans for private households, which 
were interested in participating in the 
grid-connected photovoltaics test 
stage. The program was not only ac-
companied by electro-technical and 
physical tests on inverters, cell dura-
tion etc., but also by social research 
which studied customers’ motives and 
social affiliations (cf. Gen-
nenig/Hoffmann 1996). This first niche 
program became crucial for institu-
tional capacity building and symbol-
ized an initial step towards a transfor-
mation of the energy sector. Routines 
and motives of first movers could be 
revealed, and thus enabled the advo-
cacy coalition to improve its diffusion 
strategy, for example by better taking 
into account special needs of potential 
users. In addition, the program helped 
photovoltaics to gain more public 
awareness. Backed by the feed-in-law, 
which obliged utilities to remunerate 
energy of renewable sources fed into 
the grid, the improvement of inverters 
laid the grounds for structural changes 
within the energy sector, abandoning 
traditional centralised grid systems, 
giving way to decentralised, environ-
mental friendly systems, such as grid 
connected photovoltaics applications. 
When the 1000-roofs-program ended 
and the German government did not 
immediately develop follow-up pro-
grams, “(…) one could observe a shift 
in the investment activities of the big 
European PV-companies from Europe 
towards the US” (Jäger-Waldau 2002: 
40). The ministry of economics (BMWi) 
started a market launch program for 
renewable energy technologies in 
1995. But since this program only pro-
vided 4.5 Mio. DM for photovoltaics, it 
did not meet the expectations of the 
photovoltaics industry (cf. Ristau 
1998). This is a striking example for 
the relationship between uncertainty 
and innovation. Throughout the 1990s 
the German policy did not systemati-
cally target at uncertainty. Its pro-
grams were inadequately financed and 
not based on long-term considera-
tions. As a result the development of 
technical innovations and marketable 
products came to a halt.  This only 
changed, when the Green party to-
gether with the Social Democrats came 
into power in 1998. 
Despite these shortcomings, it has to 
be admitted, that the 1990s can be 
characterised by early (successful) in-
vestments. Public funded R&D, as well 
as the first market stimulation pro-
grams and the first feed-in law did not 
only lead to the build-up of an initial 
knowledge base. It also enabled the 
creation of an embryonic advocacy 
coalition consisting of scientists, an 
infant industry and its interest organi-
sations, as well as highly committed 
environmentalists. Some of them ap-
peared as first movers on the market, 
which means they were the first cos-
tumers participating in the 1000-roof 
program. Even though the programme 
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offered soft loans, and the power pro-
duced was remunerated, these first 
users did not benefit from their in-
vestment in a monetary sense. Instead 
they appeared as ‘the hard core’ of the 
advocacy coalition, mainly acting out 
of ideological reasons. But the early 
investments and the ideological com-
mitments triggered positive feedbacks, 
which for example resulted in the abil-
ity of the coalition to shape further 
institutional change and to initiate 
sectoral transformation. Taken to-
gether the first political programs had 
significant effects. First of all public 
awareness of the new technology rose 
and photovoltaics was provided with 
legitimacy. Public and social accep-
tance as well as political support of the 
technology was achieved, subsidies 
became widely approved. Furthermore, 
a number of new, often small firms 
entered the market, “(…) among these, 
we find both module manufacturers 
and integrators of solar cells into fa-
cades and roofs, the latter moving the 
market for solar cells into new applica-
tions” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 266). 
Prior to this, the two big players, Sie-
mens and AEG Telefunken dominated 
the market. Just to give an idea: in 
1991, when the 1000-roofs-program 
was launched, 99.5% of the induced 
market demand was satisfied by these 
two companies. And even in 1993 
when the program was opened for 
European competitors like BP-Solar 
and the Italian firm Helios, Siemens 
and ASE still held a 70% market share 
(cf. Ristau 1998: 48). 
Strategic niche management in the 
1990s 
Throughout the 1990s, industrial (so-
lar) associations were gradually 
founded, which aimed to improve and 
enhance political support of the infant 
technology and its commercialization. 
Additionally, (local) groups and socie-
ties, like the Aachen Solarverein, Euro-
solar and Förderverein Solarenergie 
were founded and discussed the suit-
ability of political instruments. They 
developed blue prints for a new feed-
in-law or another roof-program and 
tried to build up political momentum. 
Local politicians, who strongly fa-
voured the idea of renewable energies 
and opted for more decentralised en-
ergy systems, joined them. To them, 
grid-connected photovoltaics applica-
tions met both of these aims. It was a 
coalition of local politicians, the Green 
party, researchers, environmental so-
cieties and business associations that 
managed to influence the federal gov-
ernment to improve and enhance its 
innovation policy for photovoltaics. 
Especially when the 1000-roofs-
program ended, strategic niche man-
agement appeared on the local level: 
protagonists of the solar scene were 
successful in implementing local feed-
in-laws, inspired by the Aachen So-
larverein. In contrast to the federal 
law, which only regulated the remu-
neration of photovoltaics power at 
arm’s length, the concept of the 
Aachen Solarverein provided cost-
covering prices. The development of a 
policy instrument that aims to con-
vince users purchasing PV for return 
on investment reasons can be inter-
preted as a change in secondary as-
pects. Still adhering to its policy core, 
the PV coalition has learned new ways 
to achieve its goal. Thus the new 
mechanism provided an opportunity 
for the wider diffusion of photovoltaics 
in a way that was not only attractive to 
ideological environmentalists as po-
tential users, but photovoltaics became 
also an interesting option for non-
ideological customers (beyond the 
initial advocacy coalition) to earn 
money. 
These initiatives were strongly sup-
ported by the infant photovoltaics in-
dustry and its associations. The solar 
industry intensified its lobbying, and in 
particular due to some of the global 
players that were also involved in cell 
production, like Siemens and ASE be-
coming part of the advocacy coalition, 
political pressure began to become 
more effective. Siemens, which was 
already producing in the USA, com-
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plained, that due to the lack of domes-
tic demand in Germany, it would not 
make sense, coming back to Germany, 
and ASE threatened to follow Siemens 
if no follow up program would be 
started. In reaction the federal gov-
ernment started a debate on the 
100.000-roofs-program. This long-
term-perspective for public funding i.e. 
creating a niche market was the rea-
son for ASE to stay in Germany and 
even build up new production plants. 
It increased its capacity from 20 to 50 
MW by the end of 2002 under the 
name of RWE-Schott Solar (cf. 
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006:268). 
In the PV coalition’s formative stage 
significant opposition arose. Industrial 
organizations, especially German utili-
ties strongly opposed political instru-
ments to support photovoltaics, such 
as the early energy-feed-in-law from 
1991 (cf. Wong 2005: 135). In 1994 
Preussen Elektra lodged a complaint 
against this law at the European and 
the German federal level. Opposition 
was not only voiced as a general cri-
tique of subsidizing renewable energy 
technologies, but it was also targeted 
at the specific design of the feed-in 
law, which indeed disadvantaged some 
of the utilities. Since renewable energy 
is mainly produced in the windy re-
gions nearby the coast (wind power) 
and photovoltaics applications are 
concentrated in the sunny South, the 
bias led to the situation, that some of 
the Northern utilities or their custom-
ers respectively, had to finance subsi-
dies for renewable energy technolo-
gies. The case was dismissed, but the 
discussion did not stop. 
4.2 Take-off (1998 - 2007) 
Following Sabatier’s argument, policy 
change can only be achieved acommo-
dating external perturbations, such as 
changes in the government coalition or 
impacts from other subsystems. This 
seems also to be true for the case of 
PV. When in 1998 the Green party, to-
gether with the Social Democrats 
formed the federal government, the 
photovoltaics advocacy coalition took 
its chance. Rather than trying to have 
an impact on energy policy from out-
side it now could directly influence the 
rebuilding of institutional frames and 
policy programs. The Greens took over 
the ministry of the environment and 
this initiated the institutionalization of 
the photovoltaics advocacy coalition 
within the centre of political power. 
The situation in the late 1990s was 
accompanied by international and 
European trends, such as the liberali-
zation and deregulation of the energy 
sector and an increased focus of inter-
national institutions as well as the 
European Commission on CO2 reduc-
tion as a political target with top prior-
ity, initiated by the Kyoto protocol. 
As a consequence of the change in 
political power constellations a re-
structuring of the energy sector began. 
Institutional settings and the infra-
structure of the energy sector became 
more open and fluent. Corporate 
structures were being reorganised and 
replaced by more competitive man-
agement and governance structures. 
Thus innovation in photovoltaics was 
accompanied by the re-structuring of 
the energy sector and social innova-
tions like new management concepts, 
new user routines, “new roles and 
identities of electricity customers, new 
policy problems, regulatory concepts, 
institutions and governance arrange-
ments” (cf. Voß et al. 2003: 4). These 
transformation processes have been 
crucial factors to trigger innovation in 
photovoltaics because they opened the 
window of opportunity for the success 
of an advocacy coalition against the 
resistance of the powerful advocates of 
incumbent energy sources. 
The stabilisation of the advocacy coali-
tion 
Two policy instruments were designed 
and implemented, which are widely 
appreciated as having been decisive for 
the German photovoltaics success 
story. The actual design of the instru-
ments has been prepared and debated 
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by solar groups, societies and associa-
tions. Groups like Eurosolar, 
Förderverein Solarenergie and Green-
peace were extremely important for an 
adjusted ‘relaunch’ of the former 1000-
roofs-program. 
In 1999 the program, which aimed at a 
market stimulation, was launched. It 
offered soft loans with 10 years dura-
tion and the redemption starting in the 
third year. In 2000 the Renewable En-
ergy Law was passed. It set a feed-in 
tariff of around 50 Cent2 per kWh fixed 
for 20 years, with a 5% decrease annu-
ally for later installations from 2002 
on. Compared to the first feed-in-law, 
which had been heavily opposed by the 
utilities, the additional costs of renew-
able energies were now shared and 
only five per cent of the financial 
charges had to be paid by the utilities. 
The law was inspired by the local feed-
in laws for solar power as the learning 
effects which had been achieved on 
the local level helped the Greens to 
move the concept to the federal level. 
For this process it was extremely help-
ful that one of the main protagonists 
of the local groups, which had organ-
ized local feed-in tariffs, was elected as 
a federal deputy in 1998 and thus 
could bring in experiences he had 
made on the local level (cf. Rosenbaum 
et al 2005: 79). He was among the 
Green deputies, who initiated a discur-
sive process involving various actors, 
such as environmental groups, solar 
industry associations, the association 
of the machinery and equipment pro-
ducers VDMA, the metalworkers trade 
union, solar cell producers and politi-
cians from some Länder. This institu-
tionalization of an intermediate level 
of conflict can be interpreted referring 
to Sabatier’s concept of policy learn-
ing. The panel did not intend to con-
duct a general discussion on the future 
of the German energy system (the pol-
                                                       
2 The exact amount is subject to size and 
application: electricity from rooftop sys-
tems is reimbursed higher than electricity 
sourced from ground-mounted systems. 
icy core, still separating the coalitions), 
instead it only discussed the issue of 
financial support for renewable energy 
technologies. Hence, in 1998 the Green 
party acted as a policy broker, search-
ing for compromises in secondary as-
pects that could be supported by the 
majority of actors. This facilitated the 
enlargement and stabilization of the 
advocacy coalition in a way that guar-
anteed its survival even without insti-
tutional backing in the future. 
“The unorthodox coalition even included a 
major utility (…); as a result the big utilities 
were not united in their opposition.” 
(Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 267) 
Besides innovation in PV was still sup-
ported by public research money – 
albeit in a decreasing manner. Public 
money became concentrated on net-
work and cluster projects, many of 
them part of structural policies in or-
der to help the economically underde-
veloped regions in the East of Ger-
many. Regional cluster and network 
policy is a rather new policy instru-
ment that aims to create an innovation 
friendly environment by fostering col-
lective identities and trust to support 
the formation and elaboration of local 
networks (cf. Dohse 2007). Within the 
last years, the solar industry has well 
understood where to settle down in 
order to receive subsidies. Several 
photovoltaics clusters have been es-
tablished in East Germany especially in 
the small town of Thalheim nearby 
Bitterfeld in Saxony-Anhalt. Particu-
larly small start-ups, which emerged 
after 2000, have settled down in the 
Eastern regions. One of the world 
leaders in cell production became Q-
Cells, a firm, founded in Berlin in 1999, 
which soon moved to Thalheim in or-
der to start cell production in 2001. Q-
Cells is one example of Germany’s 
success story. It perfectly reflects the 
effectiveness of the 100.000-roofs-
program and the Renewable Energy 
Law. At the end of 2002 Q-Cells em-
ployed 82 persons, at the end of 2004 
it already had 484 employees, a num-
ber which has grown to 1.700 at the 
end of 2007. 
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Q-Cells also can serve as an example 
on how the photovoltaics industry is 
now increasingly able to get financing 
and venture capital from the private 
sector and the equity market. Since 
October 2005 Q-Cells is listed on the 
Frankfurt stock exchange, and since 
December 2005 it is included in the 
technology index TecDax of the Ger-
man stock exchange. This shows that 
the industry has left the formative 
stage, i.e. the niche market and has 
been entering the take off stage – 
ready for market expansion. 
Market expansion and growing public 
acceptance 
The take-off stage is characterized by a 
significant enlargement and diversifi-
cation of the photovoltaics advocacy 
coalition. This applies to producers as 
well as to users. Whereas first produc-
ers like the Freiburg Solar-Fabrik, 
founded in 1996 by the environmental-
ist Georg Salvamoser, were embedded 
in local solar networks and were not 
solely led by return on investment 
thinking, motives and behaviours of 
producers like Q-Cells do not differ 
from producers in other sectors. Addi-
tionally, due to the Renewable Energy 
Law, users of photovoltaics are not 
any longer necessarily led by ‘green’ 
motives, as it has increasingly become 
profitable to purchase solar modules, 
especially for farmers, who have plenty 
of space on their barn roofs, which can 
be used as building ground for the 
rather cheap thin film technology (cf. 
Rosenbaum et al 2005: 85f.).3 Fur-
thermore, this development is accom-
panied by the wide acceptance of solar 
energy within the German public. This 
trend is vividly reflected in the Chris-
tian Democratic party, which now has 
well accepted the strategy of creating a 
                                                       
                                                      
3 The literature on strategic niche man-
agement sees the prevalence of economic 
motives as an impediment to the success of 
policies (Hoogma et al. 2002). We are argu-
ing that exactly the opposite mechanism 
(addressing economic motives) has been 
essential for the success of PV policies.   
niche market for photovoltaics. Thus, 
when in 2005 the Red-Green govern-
ment ended and was replaced by the 
grand coalition of Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats, the new 
government did not opt for striking a 
new path. The Renewable Energy Law 
was not abolished and it is save to say, 
that the amendment of the law does 
not entail comprehensive changes for 
PV support. 
The take-off stage has also been ac-
companied by organizational changes, 
which helped to consolidate the cho-
sen path. In 2002, after the re-election 
of the Red-Green government, the coa-
lition parties agreed that the ministry 
of the environment should obtain full 
responsibility for renewable energies. 
Whereas the beginning of the forma-
tive stage had been characterised by 
conflicts of competences between the 
ministry of economics and the ministry 
of research, and both being rather 
averse to substantially supporting 
photovoltaics, in 2002 the situation 
completely changed. The ministry of 
the environment is now responsible 
for the Renewable Energy Law as well 
as the public financing of photovol-
taics related R&D.4 
Meanwhile the photovoltaics industry 
in Germany is highly differentiated, as 
concerns the command of competing 
technologies and in the capability to 
set up important links to surrounding 
industries. Therefore photovoltaics 
related R&D is not just research on 
new materials and cell efficiencies. An 
increasing number of projects is 
funded which carry out research on 
inverters. This also holds true for the 
firms, which produce the technology. 
 
4 Other elements of institutionalization are 
the so-called ‘Glottertal talks’, which are 
strategic talks on photovoltaics related 
R&D. These talks originated in 1987, but 
have gained importance particularly during 
the last couple of years. Researchers and 
representatives of the leading institutes 
and companies meet with members of the 
ministry of the environment in order to 
discuss future public R&D activities for PV. 
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„For instance, in 2000, there were ten firms 
showing roof integrated solar cells at an 
exhibition (…) and Germany is seen as the 
world leader in roof integrated solar cells.” 
(Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 268) 
Especially the German machine build-
ing industry has benefited from the 
emergence of photovoltaics. Likewise 
German solar producers took advan-
tage of the expertise of the machine 
building industry, since, as mentioned 
above, many innovations in photovol-
taics are geared to cost reductions in 
the production processes. 
Architects and craftsmen, especially 
electricians have well adapted to the 
new technology as a growth option for 
their businesses and surrounding in-
stitutions of vocational education 
managed to adjust their curricula. 
Thus well-known bottle-necks that 
often constrain the diffusion of new 
technologies have been overcome. 
A new coalition 
The specific dynamic of the advocacy 
coalition can be revealed if we look at 
the machine building industry. This 
industry, which cannot be considered 
to be part of the original energy policy 
subsystem proper, is strongly support-
ing the PV coalition. In its early forma-
tive stage the coalition exclusively fo-
cused on promoting renewable energy 
technologies. It shared a joint policy 
core, which aimed at the transforma-
tion of the energy sector through sub-
stituting nuclear and fossil power 
plants for renewable energy technolo-
gies. Ensuing learning processes 
helped to develop new policy instru-
ments. Former radical opposition 
against the traditional energy sector, 
based on theories and visions high-
lighting worst case scenarios on the 
one hand and demonstrations and 
blockade actions on the other hand, 
gave way to more pragmatic consid-
erations and helped the coalition to 
gain political power. The new PV policy 
core is now characterised not as pure 
opposition, but as supporting PV. Its 
formation has been accompanied by 
new theories, visions and ideas on 
generating demand for PV by reducing 
costs, increasing returns, spreading 
information and eventually on finding 
ways to enlarge the coalition.  As a 
result the machine building industry 
could be integrated into the coalition. 
Even some utilities, which either do 
not belong to the policy subsystem or 
explicitly share another policy core 
became affiliated to the coalition. 
Thus, the policy changes towards a 
concentration on positive support of 
PV prepared the ground for the inte-
 
Figure 1: PV power installed in Germany (MWp) 
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gration of a heterogeneous set of al-
lies. 
4.3 Success Indicators 
The success story can be further illus-
trated by providing some quantitative 
indicators. In order to measure ‘suc-
cess’ we will use the indicators ‘in-
stalled PV power’, ‘production’, 'export 
sales’, ‘employees’ and ‘patents’. 
As figure 1 impressively shows, in-
stalled PV power was on a relatively 
low level, then doubled for the first 
time in 2000 and has grown continu-
ously since then. These findings dem-
onstrate the correlation between policy 
instruments that were applied by the 
federal Red-Green coalition govern-
ment, the regulatory legal instruments 
supporting PV, and the expansion of 
the market. 
In 2005 “(…) Germany accounted for 
more than 93% of the EU 25” (Jäger-
Waldau 2006: 75) installations. Stable 
political and socio-economical condi-
tions do not only convince private 
households to install photovoltaic 
power installations, but solid markets 
also stimulate the investment in new 
production capacities for solar cells 
and modules. 
As can be seen from figure 2, cell pro-
duction now amounts to more than 
500 MW annually. Sales as well as ex-
port shipments of the German photo-
voltaics industry have been rising at a 
comparable rate, as it is shown in fig-
ure 3 and 4. 
Sales figures and numbers of photo-
voltaics power installed can show the 
market success of photovoltaics. But 
even more common to measure inno-
vation are patent data, since “(…) pat-
ents provide a uniquely detailed source 
of information on inventive activity” 
(cf. OECD 1994: 9). As figure 5 shows, 
Japan is far ahead in patent applica-
tions, followed by the USA and Ger-
many.5 German patent activities well 
 
                                                                 
5 It is striking that Japan accounts for 74% 
of all patent applications, but this is mainly 
reflect the global increase of photovol-
taics patents from around 500 in the 
early 1990s up to around 2000 in 2002. 
The numbers for Germany are not 
much different from those of the USA, 
and Germany is far ahead of other in-
dustrialized countries, such as its 
European neighbours. Rather than 
being a precondition for the further 
development of PV the data seem to 
suggest that the economic success of 
PV spurred hectic activities to protect 
intellectual property. 
Altogether these figures clearly prove 
the (at least short term) success of the 
PV industry. It is expanding production 
in Germany and off shore, it is increas-
ing the export ratio of its production, it 
is employing ever more people, it is 
working profitable and it accumulates 
intellectual capital. Meanwhile more 
companies are active in this sector and 
more people working there than in 
many established economic sectors. 
5 A future for photovoltaics? 
In the beginning we claimed that the 
creation of niche markets can be a 
successful policy instrument in coordi-
nated market economies (hypothesis 
1), if a powerful advocacy coalition can 
be mobilised (hypothesis 2). 
Our analysis has shown that the sup-
port of PV after 1998 has proved to be 
successful in establishing a growing, 
profitable economic activity. The PV 
industry can produce and sell its prod-
ucts both in Germany and abroad. The 
story, however, has also proved that 
the success of such a policy depends 
on many favourable circumstances. It 
does not only need broad political and
 
due to characteristics of the Japanese pat-
ent law system, which makes the process 
of applying for a patent easier and cheaper 
than in the USA and Germany. Further-
more, in Japan normally one invention is 
divided into small elements and for each a 
patent application is filed (cf. Siemer 2005: 
66). Therefore comparing German patent 
activities with the Japanese would be bias-
ing. 
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Figure 2: Solar cell production in Germany (Mw) 
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Figure 3: Sales of the German photovoltaics industry (Mio. Euro) 
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Figure 4: Export sales of the German photovoltaics industry (Mio. Euro) 
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public support that goes beyond the 
initial rather limited policy core, but 
also a delicate architecture of instru-
ments that are geared towards the 
special characteristics of the system to 
be supported. The policy instruments 
are mostly not generic, but geared 
towards the specific problems of the 
PV industry. 
The success of PV is also linked to 
frame conditions, offering a window of 
opportunity for change. The electric 
power sector faced new challenges 
over the last years. These challenges 
originated in a move to liberalize mar-
kets, the expectation that the sector 
should contribute to environmental 
aims and the development of new 
technologies (e.g. renewable energies) 
each of them apparently hard to cope 
with by the dominant regime of the 
sector. PV as an innovative decentral-
ized small technology, which could be 
connected to the grid without severe 
difficulties and compatibility problems 
successfully, exploited the emerging 
opportunity. PV could rely on existing 
scientific knowledge in this area and 
the expertise of suppliers (e.g. machine 
building industry). 
The political instruments developed 
offered long term security for the in-
dustry as well as incentives to build 
new production units in the disadvan-
taged regions of the new German 
Länder. The users of PV-modules were 
guaranteed a 20-year security on their 
investments. Insofar PV could serve 
many masters. The present strength of 
the coalition has only recently been 
proved when the federal government 
amended the Renewable Energy Law 
without implementing important 
changes. It achieved nearly unanimous 
support by a public in favour of clean 
technologies, and it was supported by 
an advocacy coalition comprising sci-
entists, politicians, environmentalists 
and increasingly economic actors. 
 
Figure 5: Global patent applications in photovoltaics 
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Taken together the many beneficial 
factors and the very specific composi-
tion of the advocacy coalition also 
point to the difficulties to imitate this 
successful experiment in other areas. 
The lesson cannot be that the same 
policy should be and can be pursued in 
other cases as well. Rather, the general 
lesson learned is that customized in-
novation policies need to reflect the 
specific conditions and opportunities 
in the targeted areas. 
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